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VENTUkECAPITAL AND CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION
ABSTRACT
Thispaper investigates the links between capital gains taxation and
the level of venture capital activity.I examine two explanations
of how reducing the personal capital gains tax rate may spur venture
capital: the first focuses on the supply of funds to the venture
industry, and the second on the supply of entrepreneurs. The supply
of funds is unlikely to be the principal mechanism through which the
tax affects venture capital, since less than half of venture invest-
ors face individual capital gains tax liability on their realized
gains. Moreover, most of the growth in venture funding during the
last decade has come from tax-exempt investors. Individual capital
gains taxes may however have a significant influence on the demand
for venture funds. These taxes have an important impact on the
incentives of entrepreneurs and other employees of start-up firms
who forego wage and salary income and accept compensation through
corporate stock and options. The paper closes by noting that
reducing the tax rate on all gains is a relatively blunt device for
encouraging venture investment. Venture investments account for
less than one percent of realized capital gains.
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